Prior research characterizes management earnings forecasts (MEFs) as voluntary corporate disclosures designed to increase transparency (i.e., reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors, satisfy analysts" demand for information, lower a firm"s cost of capital, reduce a firm"s litigation risk) or allow managers to trade opportunistically in their firm"s stock based on their inside information. We offer and test a unified framework of management guidance that incorporates these two reasons along with an additional, and often overlooked rationale for managers to issue MEFs -under rule 10b-5 of the Securities Acts managers have an affirmative duty to disclose material information or abstain from trading in their firm"s securities. An empirical model combining all three rationales for managers to issue forecasts reveals that the typical variables of interest in MEF studies exhibit different explanatory power depending on which of the three underlying rationales is most likely driving the manager"s decision to issue guidance. The finding that managers" 10b-5 disclose or abstain incentives affect the issuance of MEFs has implications for the sample selection and research design choices of future MEF research. It also suggests that prior studies ignoring this explanation for managers" issuance of MEFs suffer from identification problems as well as from the effects of correlated omitted variables, both of which serve to undermine the inferences drawn in such studies.
Introduction
review of the empirical disclosure literature calls for research into the economic factors affecting management"s voluntary disclosure choices. We provide evidence along those lines by investigating the effects of voluntary disclosure incentives, strategic/opportunistic motives related to insider trading, and the disclose or abstain (DOA) provisions underlying securities laws and exchange listing requirements on managers" decision to issue management earnings forecasts (MEFs).
1
Prior research commonly treats MEFs as voluntary disclosures made for a variety of reasons including reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors (see, e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991 , Ajinkya and Gift 1984 , and Graham et al. 2005 , satisfying analysts" demand for information, lowering a firm"s cost of capital, facilitating access to capital markets (see, e.g., Frankel et al. 1995 and Coller and Yohn 1997) , guiding analysts to beatable earnings targets, reducing a firm"s expected litigation costs (see, e.g., Skinner 1994 and Kasznik and Lev 1995) , and for managers to trade strategically/ opportunistically in their firm"s securities (see, e.g., Noe 1999 , Rogers and Stocken 2005 , and Cheng and Lo 2006 . We group these reasons into two overall rationales: incentives for voluntary disclosure and strategic/opportunistic motivations.
An additional economic rationale for managers to issue MEFs has received little (if any) attention in the literature  namely, regulations imposed by the Securities Acts and stock exchanges requiring managers to disclose any material information they have prior to trading in their firm"s securities (see, e.g., Loss and Seligman 2004 and Heitzman, et al. 2010) . Specifically, SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibits insiders from trading based on material information. Insiders must either disclose their material information or abstain from trading (the "disclose or abstain rule" hereafter DOA). Thus, an additional rationale for managers to issue MEFs is to comply with these regulations, because MEFs are a simple and effective way for managers to disclose material information prior to trading in their firm"s securities. A key aspect of such MEFs is that managers" decision to issue them is not driven by either of the two rationales noted above, namely, managers" incentives for voluntary disclosure or their desire to be strategic/opportunistic when trading in their firm"s securities. Simply put, some MEFs are not issued voluntarily or for opportunistic reasons. Instead, managers issue some MEFs because (i) they wish to buy or sell stock, (ii) they are in possession of material private information, and (iii) they wish to comply with DOA requirements that mandate disclosure. Stated differently, managers" decision to issue MEFs is affected by materiality considerations, a determinant that has not been recognized in prior studies which have focused on voluntary explanations and/or opportunistic reasons for managers" issuance of MEFs.
We conjecture that issuing MEFs to comply with DOA requirements constitutes a separate and distinct economic rationale for why managers issue MEFs.
While the literature recognizes that MEFs are issued for a variety of reasons, no study comprehensively examines the alternative explanations. Rather, a typical study assumes one motive for why MEFs are released (e.g., to reduce the threat of shareholder litigation or to satisfy analysts" demand for earnings-related information) and then either introduces control variables to capture other MEF disclosure incentives, or ignores them altogether. More importantly, no study examines the extent to which mangers" compliance with DOA requirements is a determinant of their decision to issue a MEF.
Including all MEFs in a study to test say the effect of MEF disclosure on firms" cost of capital (see, e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997) and thereby ignoring the fact that managers may issue some MEFs for DOA reasons creates two problems. First, including some MEFs that were not issued voluntarily reduces the power of the test. Second, inclusion of DOA MEFs introduces a correlated omitted-variables problem that can bias the inferences drawn if any of the independent variables used to measure "cost of capital" effects also capture managers" DOA incentives. More generally, not controlling for managers" DOA incentives to issue a MEF opens such papers up to the criticism of failing to control for a credible alternative hypothesis that might also explain the results.
Since previous research testing the theories, rationales, and economic effects of management"s decision to issue MEFs assumes all such forecasts were either issued voluntarily or for strategic/ opportunistic reasons, such research has not fully captured the richness of the process driving managers to issue MEFs. To address this shortcoming, and to provide research on the economic factors affecting management"s disclosure choices, we offer a unified framework of MEFs and perform empirical tests that incorporate the competing explanations. The competing explanations are voluntary disclosure benefits, compliance with DOA requirements, and strategic/opportunistic trading in their firm"s securities. To conduct such tests we classify all MEFs into three mutually exclusive subsets based on properties of the observed data designed to capture the above three rationales. In addition to aiding in the structure of the tests of our unified theory, our approach to classifying MEFs into those issued voluntarily, to satisfy DOA requirements, and for strategic/opportunistic reasons will be useful to future researchers interested in constructing more powerful tests of the economic determinants and consequences of management earnings guidance. 2 Our unified MEF framework is based on the simple premise that throughout a given fiscal period managers continuously decide whether to issue guidance and whether to trade in their firm"s securities.
From a theoretical perspective, managers gain utility from issuing earnings guidance and/or trading in their firm"s stock. A feature of our empirical tests is that we model the utility managers" gain from making such decisions. However, since the actual motives driving these decisions are unobservable (i.e., since we cannot observe the utility a manager derives from the alternative decisions), we (and researchers in general) cannot know the direction of causality, or even if a causal relation exists, between these two decisions for any given MEF observation or insider trading transaction. 3 To distinguish between the opportunistic and voluntary incentives for issuing MEFs, it is important to differentiate between managers" ex ante opportunism and ex post opportunism with respect to trading in their firm"s securities and their MEF disclosure decisions. Ex ante opportunism occurs when managers withhold material information or release biased material disclosures and then trade. "Biased" disclosures are those that differ from the manager"s private information. Ex ante opportunism transfers wealth from existing shareholders to the manager. Such behavior is fraudulent and subjects the manager to civil and criminal penalties (if detected and proven). If the manager discloses unbiased information, observes the market reaction, and then trades in the firm"s securities because of his/her conjecture that the market mispriced the news, such a manager is behaving opportunistically, but the opportunism is ex post. This is because the manager faithfully (unbiasedly) represented his/her private information, and by trading in the firm"s securities is simply betting the market is wrong. Here it is important to note that the manager has fulfilled his/her fiduciary responsibilities by faithfully disclosing unbiased information prior to trading in the firm"s securities. Simply put, the marginal investor and the manager have different expectations of firm value and no wealth transfers occur until the actual results are known. While it is straight-forward to describe these alternative scenarios conceptually, it is difficult (if not impossible) to empirically identify ex ante opportunism from ex post opportunism because one cannot observe biased disclosures, except in rare cases of proven or admitted fraud. 2 Our analysis focuses on MEFs issued before the last three weeks of the fiscal period which means that we do not focus on the managerial decision to issue warnings/preannouncements. Warnings/preannouncements are likely made to reduce expected litigation exposure (Skinner, 1994 and . 3 For example, a manager might be faced with a large liquidity shock (i.e., a divorce settlement) and must sell some stock. To comply with DOA requirements, because he/she is in possession of material information about his/her firm, he/she issues a MEF and then trades. Here the desire to trade causes the release of the MEF. Alternatively, a manager may observe that the market"s consensus forecast of current quarter"s earnings is too high, and wishing to maintain the firm"s reputation with analysts, decides to reveal his/her private information via a MEF. In the event the manager believes that the market "over-reacted" to the MEF, and conjectures the firm is now under/over-valued, he/she only then decides to trade. Here, the issuance of the MEF "caused" the manager to trade.
Not knowing the exact motives for managers" decision to trade in their firm"s securities and their decision to issue a MEF necessitates indirect tests of our unified framework. In this vein, we first organize all MEFs into three mutually exclusive subsamples based on observed properties of the data such as characteristics of the forecast, the market reaction to the forecast, and the forecast error (details later). Each subsample is designed to contain MEFs most likely to have been issued because of incentives for voluntary disclosure, because of DOA requirements, or strategic/opportunistic motives.
We use these subsamples to estimate a multinomial probit model of the disclosure of a MEF in a given firm quarter using independent variables designed to capture the voluntary disclosure, DOA, and opportunistic incentives for managers" issuance of MEFs. The multinomial probit model captures the multiple, discrete, and unordered nature of the outcomes of the managerial decision described above (i.e., whether to issue guidance or not and whether to trade in their firm"s securities or not). With three subsamples of MEFs, the dependent variable in the multinomial probit model takes on a value of one, two, or three (depending on the MEF subsample) if a MEF was issued in the fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise. The estimation approach allows the coefficients on the independent variables to differ across subsamples.
Our unified MEF framework leads us to the following prediction. The voluntary, DOA, and opportunistic disclosure independent variables will have greater explanatory power in their respective MEF disclosure subsample than in the other two subsamples. Consistent with this, our main results can be summarized as follows. Using a sample of 23,144 MEFs obtained from the First Call database from 1998-2007, we classify 15,571 (68.1%) as voluntary MEFs, 4, 237 (18.3%) as DOA MEFs, and 3,156 (13.6%) as opportunistic MEFs. While 68.1% of all MEFs are classified as voluntary, a substantial portion (31.9%) is not. As predicted by our unified MEF framework, the voluntary, DOA, and opportunistic disclosure proxies have greater explanatory power in their respective subsample of MEFs than in the other two subsamples. We also provide evidence supporting our classification of MEFs, which adds construct validity to our organization of all MEFs into three subsamples. For example, MEFs classified as DOA are more likely to be issued concurrently with an earnings announcement (76%) than opportunistic MEFs (52%) or voluntary MEFs (59%). DOA MEFs are more likely to have insider trading in the five days following the MEF"s release than opportunistic MEFs, and, given there is insider trading in the five days following the MEF"s release, the intensity of that insider trading following DOA MEFs is greater than that in the same five day window following the release of either a voluntary or an opportunistic MEF. Lastly, we provide evidence on whether the insider trading associated with the DOA and Opportunistic subsamples exhibits differential predictive ability for future profitability and stock returns. If managers issue DOA MEFs with the desire to release their material information before they trade, such insider trading should have no (or at least weak) predictive ability for future profitability and stock returns. Analogously, if our approach to classify MEFs as Opportunistic captures MEFs issued by managers that are motivated by a desire to trade opportunistically in the firm"s stock, then, such insider trading should have predictive ability for future profitability and stock returns. The results support these predictions as we find that the insider trading associated with the Opportunistic subsample of MEFs exhibits predictive ability for future profitability and stock returns while the DOA subsample of MEFs does not.
Our findings have implications for the research design choices of future MEF studies as well as for prior research using MEFs to test voluntary disclosure theories and incentives. First, since roughly 32% of all MEFs do not appear to be made voluntarily, studies treating all MEFs as voluntary disclosures misclassify roughly 32% of their sample, potentially leading to a loss of power on one hand or to incorrect inferences on the other. Second, prior MEF papers implicitly assume their independent variables are only capturing incentives for voluntary disclosure (i.e., only measuring the benefits posited by voluntary disclosure theories). The problem, however (as discussed later), is that some of the variables used to proxy for incentives for voluntary disclosure also proxy for managerial incentives to issue MEFs to adhere to DOA requirements. This calls into question the inferences drawn in prior MEF studies about the predicted effects of voluntary disclosure variables. Third, the well-accepted association between voluntary disclosures such as MEFs and a firm"s cost of capital need not be causal (see also Heitzman, et al., 2010) . A widely cited result in the disclosure literature is that increased disclosure causes a lower cost of capital. An alternative interpretation is that firms with a lower cost of capital have stock prices that are more sensitive to earnings information and as a result such firms have lower materiality thresholds.
Because firms with a low cost of capital have lower materiality thresholds they will disclose more in general, and specifically, are more likely to issue a MEF to comply with DOA provisions requiring a manager to disclose all material information before trading in the firm"s securities.
Our study is not without limitations. First, like many studies, we are testing a joint hypothesis: the efficacy of our approach of using observed properties of the data (characteristics of firms" MEFs and insider trading) to form subsamples capturing the underlying motives of managers to issue MEFs (voluntary, DOA and opportunistic), and our unified MEF framework. Our approach to classify unobservable managerial motives likely produces some misclassifications. If such misclassifications are random, they simply reduce the power of our tests to distinguish between the competing motives for managers to issue MEFs as outlined in our unified framework. If the misclassifications are not random, our inferences about the relative importance of the competing motives for managers to issue MEFs are potentially misleading. Since we recognize that our classification scheme is imperfect, we do not predict that the variables used to explain MEF disclosure will only be significant in their corresponding subsample. Rather, misclassification may lead an independent variable only predicted to explain 6 voluntary MEFs to also appear significant in say the opportunistic subsample if enough voluntary MEFs are misclassified as opportunistic. Problems of misclassification are not unique to our setting. Studies requiring measures of earnings management, conservatism, unexpected returns, unexpected earnings etc., also suffer from similar errors-in variables problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature and Section 3 develops our unified framework of MEFs and discusses our research design. Section 4 describes the data and reports summary statistics, Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
This section summarizes research: on the securities regulation underlying managers" affirmative duty to disclose material information or abstain from trading; MEFs; insider trading; and jointly on MEFs and insider trading.
Management's affirmative duty to disclose material information or abstain from trading
In general, managers have no affirmative duty to disclose material information or events under the securities laws unless "(1) a Commission statute or rule requires disclosure, (2) an "insider" …is trading, or (3) a previous disclosure is or becomes inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading" (see Loss and Seligman 2004, p. 3510-3511) . The central focus of our study is (2), because it clearly states that, if insiders want to trade in their firm"s securities, Rule 10b-5 prohibits them from doing so unless they first disclose any material information in their possession. Insiders must either disclose that material information or abstain from trading (DOA). Accounting Bulletin 99 and Regulation Full Disclosure (Reg FD) list types of information that may help determine materiality, neither provides specific guidance on the defintion of material information. The lack of clarity creates substantial uncertainty as to when managers must make a disclosure. Heminway 4 The SEC routinely brings between 40 to 60 insider trading actions annually (see sec.gov/spotlight/insider trading. shtml). Besides SEC insider trading enforcement, FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) oversees U.S. stock exchanges using insider trading surveillance and investigation programs for all listed securities in the United States, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursues criminal cases. One prominent recent case involved the 2007 conviction of Joe Nacchio, former CEO of Qwest, on 19 counts of illegal insider trading connected to his sale of $52 million in Qwest stock in 2001. The DOJ alleged Nacchio sold Qwest stock while knowing of the firm"s deteriorating financial condition. He was sentenced to six years in prison and ordered to pay $71 million in fines and forfeitures (see "Supreme Court again denies ex-Qwest CEO Nacchio," Associated Press (11/30/2009) [507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974 ] the court noted that "generally earnings projections of a company constitute a prime factor in estimating the worth of its stock, especially when made close to the end of the fiscal year and therefore are material" (emphasis added).
We conjecture that insiders wishing to comply with Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act will likely issue MEFs prior to trading in their firm"s stock and that risk-averse insiders will likely set a low materiality threshold, which will result in them issuing some MEFs that are immaterial.
Research on management earnings forecasts 5
Managers" incentives to supply voluntary disclosures like MEFs include signaling good firm performance, reducing litigation risk, facilitating access to capital markets and reducing the cost of capital, and adjusting analysts" and investors" expectations. One of the predictions of the theoretical disclosure literature is that when firms" bear proprietary costs from disclosure, or when investors are uncertain about managers" information, firms will voluntarily disclose good news and withhold unfavorable news (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985 a and b; Verrecchia 2001, Evans and Sridhar, 2002) .
Early empirical evidence on MEFs is consistent with this prediction (Penman 1980; Lev and Penman 1990 ). More recently, Anikowski et al. (2007) conclude that the proportion of firms issuing guidance has increased over time, and also that managers release neutral MEFs early in a quarter, downward MEFs toward the quarter end, and upward MEFs at quarter end.
The release of MEFs, and the corresponding expected reduction in information asymmetry, is widely accepted in the disclosure literature as a means for firms to lower their cost of capital. Consistent with this view, prior research concludes there is a relation between disclosure and a firm"s cost of capital (e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997; Frankel et al. 1995; and Verrecchia and Weber 2006) and that MEFs are part of a longer-term disclosure policy where firms raising external capital are more likely to issue MEFs than non-financing firms (Frankel et al. 1995) .
The threat of litigation risk has also been advanced as a reason for managers to issue MEFs. Healy and Palepu (2001, p.422-23) conjecture that litigation risk can affect managers" disclosure choices in two opposing ways: "first, legal actions against managers for inadequate or untimely disclosures can encourage firms to increase voluntary disclosure. Second, litigation can potentially reduce managers" incentives to provide disclosure, particularly of forward-looking information." Consistent with the former, Skinner (1994) expectations, reduce information asymmetries, reduce litigation risk, etc.) or strategically (to signal good firm performance or to increase stock option compensation).
Research on insider trading
6 Papers focusing on MEFs as a means to reduce litigation risk typically focus on MEFs issued late in the fiscal quarter, or after the fiscal quarter end, but prior to the quarter"s actual earnings announcement (i.e., warnings/ earnings preannouncements). Since we exclude warnings/preannouncements from our sample, the litigation risk hypothesis is unlikely to explain our results. Nonetheless, as necessary, we introduce controls into our empirical tests to control for the effect of litigation risk on manager"s decision to issue MEFs. 7 A number of studies examine other aspects of MEFs and find that: forecast form affects the informativeness of MEFs (Pownall et al. 1993) ; firms expecting to sustain an earnings increase in the next year issue more long-term (annual) MEFs while firms expecting to have an earnings decline in the next year issue more short-term (quarterly) MEFs (Miller 2002) ; the market reaction to confirming MEFs is positive and, that while consensus analysts" earnings forecasts do not change after confirming MEFs, the dispersion in analysts" forecasts significantly declines (Clement et al. 2003) ; managers take actions to enhance the credibility of their MEFs such as supplementing them with verifiable forward-looking information (Hutton et al. 2003) ; managers" issue biased MEFs (McNichols 1989 and Rogers and Stocken 2005) ; and firms involved in class-action litigation reduce the amount of information (e.g., MEFs and conference calls) post-litigation (Rogers and Van Buskirk 2009 ). Ke et al. (2003) examine insider trading patterns leading up to a "break" in earnings increases.
They find an increase in the frequency of net insider sales in the ninth through third quarters before an earnings break and a selling pattern that is stronger in the firm-quarters drawn from growth firms. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find that insiders trade on the basis of both contrarian beliefs and private information about future cash flows and that insider purchases are positively related to future earnings performance. Huddart et al. (2007) study how insiders condition their trades on knowledge of upcoming firm disclosures. In the 20 days before a quarterly or annual earnings announcement, there is little association between insider trades and the announcement return. However, in the period following the earnings announcement and before the 10-Q or 10-K is filed, there is a strong association between the frequency and value of insider trades and the filing return, suggesting that insiders trade to profit from information made public at the filing date. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find little market reaction around actual trades and trade disclosure dates, but do find that firms where CEOs are buying tend to have stronger future returns compared to CEOs that are selling, although selling CEOs do not necessarily have negative future returns. For insiders" purchases, they find that purchases predict future price movements, but only for small firms. The results of these studies suggest that insider trading does exist and can be profitable. However, none of the studies specifically recognize the legal duty managers have to disclose material information or abstain from trading and how this duty might affect the empirical relation between insider trading and disclosure, or how it would affect the future profitability of insider trading.
Research jointly examining management earnings forecasts and insider trading
Two papers address the relation between insider trading and MEFs: Noe (1999) and Cheng and Lo (2006) . At a general level, both studies document that managers buy more shares following bad news MEFs than after good news MEFs, and sell more after good news MEFs than after bad news MEFs, results that both studies interpret as evidence of managers strategically/opportunistically timing their insider trading vis-à-vis the disclosure of MEFs. In particular, Noe (1999) studies insider trading before and after the release of MEFs to investigate whether managers are strategic/opportunistic ex ante in the sense that they trade to exploit the information revealed by the subsequent MEF. The evidence is inconsistent with such ex ante opportunism. Noe (1999) also investigates how managers trade after the release of MEFs and finds that managers generally behave like contrarians in that they buy if the stock price reaction to the MEF is negative or sell if the stock price reaction to the MEF is positive. Noe (1999) focuses exclusively on whether managers behave strategically when they trade before or after MEFs, which means he does not consider (or recognize) that managers could be issuing MEFs to comply with DOA requirements. In fact, Noe"s (1999) finding that there is significant trading following MEFs is also consistent with our alternative hypothesis that managers" issue MEFs to comply with DOA requirements.
Under that alternative hypothesis, insiders execute their trades after disclosing a MEF because it means they have disclosed their material information prior to trading as required by rule 10b-5. predict that MEFs are a mechanism for managers to disclose material information prior to trading in their firms" securities in order to comply with the securities laws. 10 In the next section, we bring this explanation together with the two rationales cited in the MEF literature to develop a unified framework of
MEFs that serves to motivate and structure our tests of these competing explanations.
8 Another interpretation of Noe"s (1999) results is managers are strategic ex post, but not ex ante in the sense they issue a MEF to reduce the cost of capital or adjust analyst expectations, etc., and only decide to trade after they observe the market response to the MEF. Here, the ex ante act of issuing the MEF could be unrelated to the decision to trade. 9 Other papers in the strategic/opportunistic category where managers are conjectured to opportunistically time MEFs to affect wealth transfers from shareholders include the following. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) who conclude (p. 73) that "CEOs make opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions (i.e., MEFs, emphasis ours) that maximize their stock option compensation." Rogers (2008) explores how insider trading affects disclosure quality and finds that managers provide higher quality disclosures (i.e., MEFs) before selling shares than they provide in the absence of trading. While the results in Rogers (2008) are consistent with managers complying with DOA requirements, unlike our study, he does not directly focus on the role of DOA requirements as a determinant of MEFs. Finally, Rees et al. (2008) find that while managers provide more pessimistic guidance prior to stock option awards than afterwards, managers do not distort pre-grant guidance.
A unified framework of managers' incentives to issue management earnings forecasts
To provide a unified framework articulating why managers issue earnings guidance, we synthesize the various explanations described in the previous section. Our objective is to illustrate that no single reason explains the release of all MEFs, and that managers desire to satisfy DOA requirements is another explanation for the issuance of some MEFs.
Based on the discussion in section 2, we categorize the alternative explanations for why managers issue MEFs into three mutually exclusive categories. First, some MEFs result from voluntary disclosure incentives (i.e., reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors, lowering the firm"s cost of capital, facilitating access to capital markets, and guiding analysts to beatable earnings targets).
Second, some MEFs are issued because managers wish to trade in their firm"s stock and want to comply with the securities laws and exchange listing rules that impose upon them an affirmative duty to disclose their private material information prior to trading (DOA). Third, some MEFs are issued by managers so they can trade opportunistically in their firm"s securities. Unlike the first rationale (incentives for voluntary disclosure), the second and third are not voluntary disclosures in the sense that managers are not issuing MEFs to maximize firm value. Rather, some MEFs are released because managers want to trade, either to comply with DOA requirements or to be opportunistic.
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Like other areas of the accounting literature, where the true motives of managers are not observable, we must develop variables to proxy for the alternative explanations offered for why managers issue MEFs. 12 Since the discussion above argues that managers issue MEFs for different reasons, we begin by organizing all MEFs into three mutually exclusive subsets based on properties of the observed MEF and insider trading data (details in section 3.1): (i) those MEFs where, a priori, the data suggest the MEFs were issued voluntarily, (ii) those MEFs where, a priori, the data suggest that managers are likely to have had an affirmative duty to disclose material information, and (iii) those MEFs where, a priori, the data suggest the MEFs were issued to allow the manager to make opportunistic trades.
Our unified framework of MEF disclosure starts with the premise that throughout a given fiscal period managers continuously decide whether to issue a MEF and whether to trade in their firm"s securities. Conceptually, this can be characterized as a setting where managers gain utility from issuing
MEFs and/or trading in their firm"s stock. While the manager selects the option generating the highest 11 As noted above, we are not focusing on managers" decision to issue earnings warnings (i.e., guidance issued shortly before or after the close of a fiscal period). Our analysis only applies to MEFs issued prior to the end of the fiscal period. 12 Examples of other areas where the motives of managers are not observable and researchers must develop proxy variables include: earnings management where proxies are required for discretionary accruals or meet or beat benchmarks, the conservatism literature where a proxy for conservatism is required, and traditional earnings/return studies where empirical proxies are required for unexpected earnings and expected stock returns.
utility, the researcher cannot observe the manager"s utility for each alternative. Only the outcome (i.e., the manager"s actual choice) is observed. More formally, manager m"s utility from selecting option k (µ mk ) can be expressed as: 
Forming MEF subsamples
Figure 1 summarizes the selection criteria (described below) used to create the voluntary, DOA, opportunistic MEF subsamples.
Subsample 1: Voluntary MEFs
Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that MEFs are issued because the benefits to the firm (and its managers) exceed the costs. A maintained assumption of voluntary disclosure models is that managers maximize shareholder value (i.e., there are no conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers).
This maintained assumption implies that MEFs issued voluntarily (but not opportunistically) are unbiased (biased MEFs are considered in subsample #3 were managers are acting opportunistically). Since the MEF is unbiased it is natural to assume that the stock price reaction to its release is also unbiased.
Empirically, however, not all post-MEF stock prices correctly capture the information contained in the MEF. While the post-MEF price will be correct on average (i.e., the market is efficient), some post-MEF prices can be "too high" and others "too low" in the sense that they are above or below the managers" conjecture of the correct stock price. As a result, after observing the post-MEF stock price, and based on their private knowledge of the firm"s future cash flows, managers can conjecture about whether their firm is mispriced. If the price is above the managers" private valuation they sell some stock; if it is below their private valuation they buy. It is important to appreciate that in this scenario there is no ex ante managerial opportunism in the sense that good news forecasts (MEF announcement CAR > 0) are not optimistic (i.e., MEF ≤ actual earnings) and likewise, bad news forecasts (MEF announcement CAR < 0) are not pessimistic (i.e., MEF ≥ actual earnings). Simply put, firms with positive abnormal MEF announcement returns (CARs) likely contain more over priced stocks and firms with negative MEF announcement CARs likely contain more under priced stocks.
Following the intuition above we assign observations to the voluntary disclosure MEF subsample using the following observed features of the data:
V1a: No insider trading in the 61-day window centered on the MEF release date. These MEFs are voluntary because an absence of insider trading in the 30 days before and after their release is an indication that the manager had no affirmative duty to disclose, or that the manager was not behaving opportunistically with regard to buying/selling stock, OR V1b: Large "good news" MEFs (a 3-day size-adjusted abnormal return centered on the MEF release day of at least +5%) followed by insider selling within 30 days and (MEF -Actual Earnings) ≤ 0 (i.e., the MEF was pessimistic). Here the market likely "over-priced" these MEFs even though they were not optimistic, OR V1c: Large "bad news" MEFs (a 3-day size-adjusted abnormal return centered on the MEF release day of at least -5%) followed by insider buying within 30 days and (MEF -Actual Earnings) ≥ 0 (i.e., the MEF was optimistic). Here the market likely "under-priced" these MEFs even though they were not pessimistic, OR V1d: Insider purchasing occurs in the 30 days prior to release of bad news MEFs or insider selling occurs in the 30 days prior to release of good news MEFs.
14,15
14 The steps likely misclassify some MEFs. For example, suppose managers issue biased MEFs in hopes of trading strategically (i.e., they issued an optimistic MEF) before selling, only to observe (ex post) that the market reaction to the MEF is smaller than expected, making it unprofitable to sell strategically. The existence of such cases cause our sample of voluntary MEFs to contain some MEFs issued opportunistically ex ante, but which did not result in any insider trading ex post. 15 Other aspects of our approach to construct the voluntary MEF subsample are worth noting. First, with regard to our cut-offs for defining "large" positive and negative CARs, our inferences are robust to using ±3% and ±10% cutoffs. Second, V1b and V1c might misclassify some DOA MEFs (subsample 2) as voluntary (subsample 1) because steps V1b and V1c classify all "large" news MEFs that are not opportunistic as voluntary MEFs. Moreover, some managers may have issued a MEF because they wanted to trade (i.e., DOA) and such MEFs resulted in large
Subsample 2: MEFs issued to satisfy disclose or abstain (DOA) requirements
Under this rationale for managers to issue MEFs, insider trading occurs because managers have personal liquidity reasons, want to diversify, or because they want to accumulate shares. Liquidity shocks include paying college tuition bills, income taxes or divorce settlements, buying homes, or exercising options (to pay the exercise price and taxes). Managers may also want to purchase shares because they believe the stock is undervalued and they want to credibly signal undervaluation, or to meet share ownership guidelines imposed by the firm"s board of directors.
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To comply with the securities laws and exchange listing rules, managers have an affirmative duty to disclose material inside information prior to trading (DOA). We assume that managers" liquidity shocks and/or their need to accumulate shares to satisfy formal or informal share ownership policies are random. This implies no association between the sign of the MEF announcement CAR and insider buying or selling. If managers wish to avoid the appearance of insider trading in their firm"s securities, they will issue MEFs that have both large and small positive and negative announcement CARs.
However, the more material private information the manager has (as measured by the difference between the consensus analyst forecast and the MEF), the more likely the manager perceives he/she has an affirmative duty to disclose, and hence the more likely the manager issues a MEF. Here the liquidity shock or need to accumulate shares caused both the manager"s trading decision and MEF issuance decision. Clearly, such MEFs are not voluntary in the sense that the manager is not issuing the MEF to capture the traditional benefits offered in the literature for voluntary disclosure such as reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors, lowering the firm"s cost of capital, or facilitating access to capital markets at favorable rates.
Since we cannot observe managers" random liquidity shocks, their decision of when to acquire shares to meet corporate ownership guidelines, or their perceived duty to disclose prior to trading, the following approach is used to select observations for DOA MEF subsample: Figure 1 summarizes the selection process underlying the construction of our three MEF subsamples.
Multinomial probit model
Since our setting is characterized by multiple, discrete, unordered outcomes, our empirical analysis uses a multinomial probit model. Specifically,
17 Clearly, not all MEFs classified by steps O3a, b, and c were necessarily issued opportunistically. For example, in some cases managers may trade (ex ante) with no intention of issuing a subsequent MEF because they do not believe they are in possession of material information. However, following their trade they learn something material so they disclose it via a MEF and the disclosure results in a large stock price reaction. That is, by chance the MEF announcement period abnormal return was positive, the insider sold, and the MEF was optimistic. Thus, it is conceivable that our subsample of opportunistic MEFs contain observations belonging in one of the other MEF subsamples.
where the dependent MEF_DUM takes the value of 1, 2 or 3 if a given firm-quarter observation is classified into the voluntary MEF, DOA MEF, or opportunistic MEF subsample, respectively, and zero for all quarters without a MEF. The independent variables are defined as follows (see Appendix A for additional details on variable definitions and measurement procedures). ERC is the quintile rank of the firm"s estimated earnings response coefficient. EARN_SURPRISE is the quintile rank of the absolute value of the difference between the most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast issued prior to three weeks before the end of the fiscal quarter and that issued prior to the actual earnings announcement date of the prior quarter, deflated by price one day before the prior quarter"s actual earnings announcement date. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the quarter.
MB is the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the quarter. RTNVOL is the standard deviation of the firm"s daily returns. EARNVOL is the standard deviation of the seasonal change in the firm"s actual quarterly EPS. HI_TECH equals one if the firm is a member of a high technology industry and zero otherwise. REGULATION equals one if the firm is a member of a regulated industry and zero otherwise. 
Determinants of MEFs issued voluntarily
The first nine independent variables in eq. (2), ERC , EARN_SURPRISE, SIZE, MB, RTNVOL, EARNVOL, HI_TECH, REGULATION and HABITUAL are variables that have been used in prior MEF studies to capture or otherwise control for voluntary disclosure incentives (see, e.g., Lennox and Park 2006) . These variables are hypothesized to be the determinants of the MEFs included in the voluntary MEF subsample (i.e., they are VOL m in eq. (1)). The intuition underlying each variable"s relation to the issuance of a MEF is discussed below.
The effect of a firm"s earnings response coefficient (ERC) on MEF disclosure is expected to be positive because managers of firms with higher sensitivity of stock prices to earnings-related information have stronger incentives to voluntarily issue MEFs (see Lennox and Park 2006) . EARN_ SURPRISE is a proxy for management"s private information (Kasznik and Lev, 1995) . 18 Under voluntary disclosure theory, managers wishing to maintain a good reputation with analysts, and to satisfy analysts" demand for timely information issue MEFs when the difference between their earnings expectations and those of analysts get large, hence the effect of EARN_SURPRISE on MEF disclosure is expected to be positive.
SIZE is used in the voluntary MEF literature to capture the incentives larger firms have to issue more frequent MEFs due to greater economies of scale in information production, greater demand for information by investors and analysts, or because they face greater litigation risk (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Frankel et al., 1995) . Based on these arguments, the effect of SIZE on MEF disclosure is expected to be positive. Lennox and Park (2006, p. 445-6) argue that "if a firm operates in a risky legal environment, the manager may forecast earnings in order to reduce expected litigation costs (see, also Skinner, 1994 and by virtue of being regulated (that is, to meet regulatory requirements), they will find it less necessary to issue MEFs to communicate new information to capital markets, which means REGULATION is expected to be negative. Finally, HABITUAL is designed to capture the benefits (e.g., lower cost of capital, timely access to capital markets at favorable rates, etc.) that managers perceive are associated with developing a reputation for providing MEFs on a regular basis. The effect of HABITUAL on MEF disclosure is expected to be positive.
In summary, under our unified MEF framework, the variables above should best explain the MEFs in the voluntary MEF subsample (i.e., subsample #1). As discussed below, some of these variables, which have been used in prior MEF studies to capture voluntary disclosure incentives, are also likely to reflect incentives for managers to issue MEFs to satisfy DOA requirements (see section 3.2.3).
Determinants of MEFs issued strategically/opportunistically
Managers issuing MEFs strategically/opportunistically presumably face weaker corporate governance and control systems, which permit such behavior. Attempts to measure the strength of firms" governance systems encounter both empirical and theoretical challenges (see, e.g., Larcker et al., 2007 and Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010) . As a result, instead of using firm characteristics such as board size or antitakeover provisions to differentiate "strong" from "weak" control systems, we use outcome measures. In particular, RESTATE and BACKDATE comprise our strategic/opportunistic determinants of disclosure (i.e., the OPP m "s) in eq. (1). RESTATE and BACKDATE are designed to capture firms with weak control systems. Under our unified MEF framework, both are expected to be positively related to managers" decision to issue MEFs for strategic/opportunistic reasons. Consistent with our unified MEF framework, these variables should best explain the issuance of MEFs in the Opportunistic MEF subsample. 
Determinants of MEFs issued to satisfy disclose or abstain (DOA) requirements
Managers desiring to trade in their firm"s securities and also wishing to satisfy DOA requirements in the securities laws and exchange listing regulations will disclose all material information prior to trading. The current judicial standard of materiality in securities law describes an item as material if there is a "substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available" (TSC v. Northway, Inc., 1976) . Two factors likely affect managers" assessment of whether they are in possession of material information or not: the extent to which their private (material) information differs from the earnings expectation held in the market and the sensitivity of a reasonable investor to a "unit" of earnings-related news (see. e.g., Heitzman, et al., 2010) . We operationalize these two constructs, that is, the materiality of the managers" information as follows. To measure whether the manager"s private information differs from the expectation held in the market we use EARN_SURPRISE, and we use a firm"s ERC to measure the sensitivity of a reasonable investor to a "unit" of earnings-related news. Under our unified MEF framework, we expect EARN_SURPRISE and ERC to be positively related to managers" decision to issue MEFs in the DOA subsample. (2005) report that firms with more outside directors issue less optimistically biased MEFs, they recognize that endogeneity makes it difficult to draw inferences about causality. To avoid such problems and also to avoid further sample size restrictions due to missing data on board composition, we use outcome measures rather than firm characteristics to proxy for governance strength. 20 Since we cannot observe a manager"s earnings forecast unless he/she discloses it, we assume that the consensus analyst forecast 21 days before the end of the quarter is an unbiased estimate of the manager"s expectation of the quarter"s earnings.
Industries

Summary
share two common explanatory variables (ERC and EARN_SURPRISE), the MEFs in the voluntary disclosure subsample are also expected to be related to explanatory variables that are predicted to be unrelated to DOA MEFs. Based on our unified MEF framework, we predict that these other explanatory variables should be more important in the voluntary MEF subsample. Our unified MEF framework leads us to predict that both RESTATE and BACKDATE should only be important in the opportunistic MEF subsample, and in principle should be insignificant in the voluntary and DOA MEF subsamples. whether there is at least one MEF issued during the period from the last quarter"s actual earnings announcement date up through one day before the current quarter"s actual earnings announcement date.
Sample selection, data and descriptive statistics
Data and sample selection
Of the 48,284 firm-quarter observations, 13,796 are MEF quarters containing 23,144 unique MEFs.
Since some firm-quarters contain multiple MEFs, to avoid any ambiguity in the test, we drop 1,104 quarters if the firm-quarter contained MEFs classified in more than one type. This final screen results in a final sample of 47,180 firm-quarter observations for use in our empirical tests.
Our definition of insider trading includes all open market purchase or sale transactions conducted
by the CEO, CFO, Chairman, President, Executive VP or Senior VP. We define a "good" ("bad") news MEF as one with a positive (negative) two-day (i.e., day 0 and +1) cumulative market-adjusted return.
We deem the MEF"s news to be "large" if the absolute value of two-day return is greater than 5%. We calculate the MEF forecast error by subtracting the management earnings forecast from actual reported EPS. Positive (negative) values indicate management pessimism (optimism).
As discussed in Section 3.1, each firm-quarter observation in the overall sample is classified into one of four mutually exclusive types (voluntary MEFs, DOA MEFs, opportunistic MEFs, or no MEF). 
Descriptive statistics
Results
Evidence on the timing of MEFs and insider trading
Before presenting our main findings, we first report some results on the timing of insider trading relative to the MEF release dates for each of the three MEF subsamples. Panel A (B) of Table 4 reports on the timing of insider sales (purchases) around MEFs using five-day event windows that are subsets of the overall -30 to +30 trading day period relative to the MEF release date (day 0).
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Focusing first on insider sales (Panel A), in the DOA subsample only 1.0% of the firm-quarters have insider sales on the MEF release date. The highest incidence of insider sales (33.2% of the DOA firm-quarters) occurs in the +1 to +5 trading day window, and the frequency of insider sales falls monotonically from the 33.2% for this period to 16.1% in the +26 to +30 day window. Consistent with our expectations, the DOA subsample has a statistically significant greater frequency of insider sales in the five days immediately following the MEF (33.2%) than either the opportunistic (22.7%) or the voluntary (7.6%) MEF subsamples. While the lower incidence of insider trading in the voluntary MEF subsample is induced by the selection criteria that firm-quarters with no insider trading in the -30 to +30
21 Not surprising, the opportunistic subsample has a higher proportion of bad news MEFs than the other subsamples because we know from the insider trading literature that insiders sell more frequently than they buy. Moreover, from Table 2 , we see that about 82% of MEFs classified as opportunistic are generated by step O2a which classifies MEFs as opportunistic if there are insider sales in the 30 days prior to the MEF and the MEF is bad news. 22 By construction, there are no insider sales or purchases in the DOA subsample from days -30 to -1 because any MEF with insider trading in the 30 days before a MEF is classified as either opportunistic or voluntary depending on the direction and magnitude of the news and insider trading (see Table 2 , Figure 1 , and section 3 for details). One interpretation of this pattern is that, consistent with managers wishing to comply with DOA requirements, MEFs classified as DOA are more likely to have insider sales immediately following the MEF"s release, and a larger fraction of the shares sold in the corresponding year get sold in the five days immediately following such MEFs vis-à-vis the other two subsamples. These findings on the intensity of insider selling add additional support to our prediction that DOA requirements motivate managers to issue
MEFs to comply with disclose or abstain requirements prior to trading. Table 2 step O3a). In other words, opportunistic managers sell before they release bad news.
Voluntary MEFs have small, but positive and significant CAR at the announcement date (mean of 0.1%).
In terms of the magnitude of CAR, the last three columns of Panel C report that the mean absolute value of CAR around DOA MEFs is 0.039%, which is significantly lower than the other two subsamples. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that risk-averse insiders wishing to comply with Rule 10b-5 will likely set a low materiality threshold when deciding whether to issue a MEF prior to trading. The relative magnitudes of the MEF announcement CARs in Panel C add further support for our prediction that DOA requirements motivate managers to issue MEFs to comply with disclose or abstain requirements prior to trading. Table 5 reports the means and medians for the independent variables used in the multinomial probit model (i.e., the DOA, OPP and VOL variables from the theoretical model in eq. (1)). The primary takeaway from Table 5 is that roughly two thirds of the variables used in prior MEF research exhibit significantly different distributional properties (based on mean and median values) across MEF subsamples. Specifically, since there are 11 variables per subsample, there are 33 tests for mean and median differences reported in Table 5 (while both MVE and LNMVE are reported only MVE is used in these comparisons). Of that total, we observe 22 (21) significant mean (median) differences at, at least, the 10% level. The likelihood of observing 22 or 21 successes (i.e., differences) where the likelihood of success (a difference) is 10% out of 33 trials is 0.000. If our approach to assigning MEFs into the three subsamples was random, we would expect to observe about three statistically significant differences in means and medians at the 10% level. Observing about 21 out of 33 differences in the distributions of the variables across subsamples is consistent with the intuition underlying our unified framework of MEFs in that it suggests that the importance of such variables in explaining the issuance of MEFs is likely to vary across subsamples. The symbol ‡ to the right of a given coefficient indicates whether it is consistent with the predictions of our unified MEF framework (see Table 1 ). For example, if a given variable is predicted to have a positive sign (e.g., ERC) then a ‡ denotes that the estimated coefficient is larger in that subsample than in the subsample where that variable is not expected to explain managers" MEF issuance. Likewise, if a given coefficient is predicted to be negative, then a ‡ denotes that the estimated coefficient is smaller in that subsample than in the subsample where that variable is not expected to explain MEF disclosure. Table 6 Panel A reports that the quintile rank of a firm"s ERC is significant in predicting all three types of MEFs. If we were able to construct MEFs subsamples without classification errors we would only expect ERC to be significant in the DOA and voluntary MEF subsamples because it is only these subsamples where our unified framework predicts that ERCs explain managers" issuance of MEFs. Since we recognized earlier that misclassifications will occur (see Section 3), our interest lies in comparing the estimated coefficients on ERC (and other variables) across the three subsamples. In particular, the ERC variable should be more important at explaining MEF issuance in the DOA and voluntary MEFs subsamples when compared to opportunistic MEFs. In a similar vein, we expect the coefficients on EARN_SURPRISE to be larger in the DOA and voluntary MEF subsamples when compared to the strategic/opportunistic subsample. With these predictions in mind, we find that the estimated coefficient on ERC is larger in the DOA and voluntary subsamples (0.084 and 0.085) when compared to the opportunistic subsample (0.067). The results also reveal that the coefficient on EARN_SURPRISE is larger in the voluntary subsample (0.080) when compared to the opportunistic subsample (0.008).
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the multinomial probit model
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Primary empirical tests of the managerial decision to issue a MEF
However, the coefficient on EARN_SURPRISE for the DOA subsample is not larger than the coefficient on EARN_SURPRISE for the opportunistic subsample. 23 The mean of HABITUAL exceeds 35% in all subsamples and reflects the tendency of firms to persistently issue MEFs as our sample period unfolds. Un-tabulated results show that HABITUAL increases from about 1% in 1998 to over 50% in 2007. The (rather) large mean value of RESTATE is because we assign it a value of one if the firm has a restatement anytime during the 1998-2007 period; rather than just having a restatement in the current quarter. Similarly, BACKDATE is assigned a value of one if a firm was alleged to have engaged in option-grant backdating anytime during the sample period, and not just having a back-dating event in the current quarter.
The next seven coefficients in Table 6 (MB, LNMVE, RTNVOL, EARNVOL, HI_TECH, REGULATION, and HABITUAL) are predicted to have a greater effect on managers" decision to issue
voluntary MEFs than either of the other two types of MEFs. That is, if a given coefficient is predicted to be positive it should be larger than that for the other two subsamples, and if the coefficient is predicted to be negative it should be smaller than in the other two subsamples. Turning to the results we find that, with the exception of LNMVE and MB, the five estimated coefficients predicted to capture voluntary disclosure incentives are consistently larger (if the coefficient is predicted to be positive) or smaller (if the coefficient is predicted to be negative) in the voluntary subsample than in at least one of the other two MEF subsamples. The last two coefficients (RESTATE and BACKDATE) are designed to capture weak corporate governance and are expected to only be important in predicting managers" issuance of MEFs in the opportunistic subsample. Consistent with this, the results reveal that both coefficients are larger than the corresponding coefficients in the other MEF two subsamples.
With 11 variables in each subsample"s multinomial probit model and two pair-wise comparisons to make between subsamples (e.g., voluntary MEFs versus each of the other two subsamples), there are 22 possible coefficient comparisons in Table 6 , where a coefficient comparison is based on the predictions of our unified MEF framework (see Table 1 ). For example, one comparison involves whether the estimated coefficient on ERC is larger in the DOA subsample than in the opportunistic subsample.
Ignoring the coefficient comparisons involving the coefficient on MB (because it has the wrong sign in the voluntary MEF subsample) leaves 20 coefficient comparisons. Of these, 14 of the comparisons are in the predicted direction (as denoted by a ‡ in Table 6 ). The likelihood of observing 14 "successes" out of 20 comparisons where the probability of "success" in each trial is 0.50 due to chance is 0.06 (one-tailed test). Overall, this evidence is consistent with our unified MEF framework which predicts that variables commonly used in the MEF literature exhibit differential explanatory power for managers" decision to issue MEFs for DOA, strategic/opportunistic, and voluntary reasons.
In addition to the coefficient comparisons reported above, Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of a series of Wald tests examining the equality of a set of coefficients across models. For example, our unified MEF disclosure framework predicts that the coefficients on ERC and EARN_SURPRISE should be larger (i.e., more important) in the DOA subsample than in the opportunistic subsample. Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of these tests. Based on a Chi-square statistic of 1.15 we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on ERC and EARN_SURPRISE are different between the DOA and opportunistic MEF subsamples. However, the Wald test does indicate that these coefficients are In summary, four of the six Wald tests reject the null hypothesis of equality at the 10% level or better. We interpret this, and the other evidence in Table 6 to be generally consistent with of our unified MEF framework in the sense that a given variable"s ability to predict managers" issuance of MEFs varies across MEF subsamples. In particular, the estimated coefficients vary in predictable ways across the three MEF subsamples, consistent with our prediction that some MEFs are issued because managers want to behave opportunistically, other MEFs are issued because managers perceive there to be benefits from making voluntary disclosures, while other MEFs are released because managers want to comply with the insider trading restrictions of the securities laws and exchange listing rules requiring them to disclose their material private information or to abstain from trading in their firm"s securities.
Extension of main empirical tests
To ensure the robustness of the inferences drawn from our main tests we perform several extensions to our main tests. First, we replaced the ±5% cutoff for defining "large" vs. "small" CARs for classifying voluntary and opportunistic MEFs (see Table 2 ) with ±3% and ±10% cutoffs. Our inferences are unchanged under these thresholds. Second, since tests in Table 6 pooled all MEFs whether they were issued concurrently with an actual earnings announcement or not, we re-estimated the multinomial probit model using only bundled MEF firm-quarters and only unbundled MEF firm-quarters. 24 Un-tabulated results of using only bundled MEF firm-quarters reveal that three of the six Wald tests reject the null hypothesis, compared to four of six Wald tests in Table 6 . In addition, the coefficient comparisons are very similar to those in Table 6 . Un-tabulated results of using only unbundled MEF firm-quarters show that two of the six Wald tests are significant and that 13 out of 20 coefficient comparisons are in the predicted direction. While the Wald test results for unbundled MEFs are weaker than those in Table 6 , this is likely due to having fewer MEF firm-quarters containing only unbundled MEFs (3,897 unbundled MEF firm-quarters vs. 12,692 MEF firm-quarters in Table 6 ). Collectively, these un-tabulated results 24 Firm-quarters containing BOTH "bundled" and "unbundled" MEFs are excluded from the models, but were included in Table 6 "s estimations. Consistent with Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) , our sample contains 7,767 firmquarters classified as only "bundled" MEFs and 3,897 as "unbundled" MEF firm-quarters (see Table 3 Panel A).
indicate that Table 6 "s results are not driven by either bundled or unbundled MEFs. Moreover, since the number of correct coefficient tests is similar across the multinomial probit models using either just bundled or unbundled MEFs, we conclude that the inferences from our main empirical tests are robust to "bundled" and "unbundled" MEFs. A final robustness test relates to our approach to forming MEF subsamples. In Table 2 MEFs. For example, some managers may have issued a MEF because they wanted to trade (i.e., to satisfy DOA requirements) and some of these MEFs resulted in large stock price changes. As a robustness check, we reran our tests with all V1b and V1c MEFs reclassified as DOA. Our earlier prior inferences remain unchanged or get stronger. For example, the significance levels of the Wald tests previously reported in Tables 6 increase.
Predictive ability of the insider trading associated with the management earnings forecasts classified as DOA and opportunistic
Prior research finds that insider trading tends to predict future firm performance in that insider purchases are generally associated with better future accounting profitability or stock returns than insider sales. To provide further evidence on the external validity of our approach to classify MEFs into subsamples, we examine the differential predictive ability with respect to future accounting profitability and stock returns. The intuition is simple. If our approach to classify MEFs as DOA captures MEFs issued by managers that are motivated by a desire to release their material information prior to trading, such insider trading should exhibit no (or weak) predictive ability for future accounting profitability and stock returns. Similarly, if our approach to classify MEFs as opportunistic captures MEFs issued by managers being motivated by a desire to be opportunistic, then the insider trading associated with such MEFs should exhibit predictive ability for future accounting profitability and stock returns.
To test this prediction, we start with all DOA and Opportunistic MEFs identified in Table 2 . For each MEF we calculate the net insider trading during the [-30, +30] trading day window centered on the MEF release date and classify a MEF as an insider purchase (insider sale) if the net insider trading during this window is purchase (sale). We examine two measures of future firm performance, the change in return on assets (ROA) and future abnormal stock returns (CAR). ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. We calculate the change in ROA for year +1 (year +2) as the sum of the seasonally differenced ROAs of the first four (second four) fiscal quarters subsequent to the [-30 , +30] trading windows centered on the MEF release date. CAR is calculated as the raw buy-and-hold return minus the buy-and-hold return of the corresponding Fama-French portfolio formed on the basis of size and book-to-market ratio. Year +1 is the first 12 months (year +2 is the first 24 months) subsequent to the [-30, +30] trading window centered on the MEF release date. We drop observations if future ROA or CAR data is unavailable. The change in ROA and CAR are winzorized at the top and bottom 1%. We test the difference between insider purchase and insider sale groups using t-tests (mean) and Wilcoxon tests (median). If insider trading surrounding opportunistic MEFs has predictive power for future performance, the difference in ROA and CAR between insider purchasing and insider sales should be positive.
The results reported in Table 7 two. This is evidence that the approach we use to classify MEFs as DOA captures MEFs issued by managers wishing to disclose their material information prior to trading in their firm"s securities. Turning to the opportunistic subsample of MEFs, the difference in mean CAR between insider purchases and insider sales is significantly positive in both the 12 and 24 month periods (5% and 1% levels, respectively). Closer examination of the results reveals the difference is driven by the 12 and 24 month CAR for insider purchases. Turning to the change in ROA, there is modest evidence of a difference (at the 5% level) in the predictive ability of insider purchases and insider sales in year +2. Since changes in ROA are a noisier measure of performance vis-à-vis returns, these results are evidence that our approach to classify MEFs as strategic is capturing MEFs issued by managers that are motivated by a desire to trade opportunistically in their firm"s securities.
Conclusions
Despite an extensive literature on MEFs, few studies recognize, and none explore the role played by insider trading restrictions of the securities laws and stock exchange listing requirements as an To address this shortcoming of prior research, and to extend the research on the economic factors affecting management"s disclosure choices, we developed a unified framework of MEFs and performed empirical tests incorporating the various explanations for why managers issue them. Specifically, voluntary disclosure benefits, strategic/opportunistic trading in their firm"s securities, and compliance with the DOA requirements specified in the SEC"s rule 10b-5. To conduct such tests we organized all
MEFs into three mutually exclusive subsets based on properties of the observed data to capture the above three rationales for why managers issue MEFs. We hypothesized that each of the three explanations to issue MEFs will have a set of independent variables that explains whether that particular type of MEF will be disclosed in a given firm quarter, and that those independent variables will have different explanatory power across the three types of MEFs.
After categorizing each firm-quarter with a MEF into the voluntary, strategic/opportunistic, or DOA MEF subsamples, we estimated a multinomial probit model to examine managers" decision to issue
MEFs. Consistent with the predictions of our unified MEF framework, the variables predicted to explain a particular type of MEF (e.g., voluntary MEFs) have greater explanatory power for the MEFs in that subsample (i.e., the subsample of voluntary MEFs) vis-à-vis the other two MEF subsamples (i.e., the opportunistic and DOA subsamples). Based on this evidence we offer the simple observation that "all MEFs are not created equal." Moreover, the issuance of MEFs is driven by alternative explanations/ rationales in the sense that no single explanation, such as incentives for voluntary disclosure (based on presumed cost of capital benefits), explains the rather complex decision process underlying managers" decision issue MEFs. In particular, some MEFs are issued voluntarily, while others are issued because managers seek opportunistic wealth transfers from shareholders, and still other MEFs are issued because managers want to satisfy the disclose or abstain provisions underlying securities laws and exchange listing rules before trading in their firm"s securities. Some limitations of our study include the following. First, our empirical analysis is a joint test of the classification scheme we use to assign MEFs into subsamples and our unified MEF framework. Since we cannot observe managers" actual motives to issue MEFs we use observed properties of the data such as the stock price reaction to the MEF, the existence of insider trading, and whether the MEF was optimistic or pessimistic to construct our three subsamples of MEFs (voluntary, opportunistic, and DOA).
While we provided some evidence in support of the construct validity to our classification scheme, an obvious extension of our study would be to refine the approaches to classify MEFs into the three subsamples, as well as to add additional independent variables pertaining to opportunistic and DOA MEFs. Such research would serve to improve the design of future MEF studies.
In summary, the economic intuition underlying the MEF framework developed in this study, along with the empirical evidence we provide, makes it inappropriate for future MEF studies to ignore disclose or abstain (DOA) requirements as a credible alternative explanation for why managers issue
MEFs. Advancement of the MEF literature will be enhanced by future MEF studies explicitly recognizing this alternative hypothesis.
Appendix A Detailed variable definitions and measurement procedures
MEF_DUM takes the value of 1, 2 or 3 if a given firm-quarter observation is classified into the voluntary MEF, DOA MEF, or opportunistic MEF subsample, respectively, and zero for all quarters without a MEF. The MEF must be issued during the period from the actual earnings announcement date of the last quarter up to one day before the current quarter"s actual earnings announcement date.
ERC is the quintile rank of the firm"s estimated earnings response coefficient. We estimate a firm-specific ERC for each firm-quarter by regressing two-day (i.e., day 0 and +1) earnings announcement period market-adjusted returns on unexpected earnings using the 16 most recent quarters (we require complete data for all 16 quarters). Unexpected earnings is actual EPS minus the most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast issued prior to the earnings announcement date, deflated by the firm"s stock price at day -1 relative to the current earnings announcement date.
EARN_SURPRISE is the quintile rank of the absolute value of the difference between the most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast issued prior to three weeks before the end of the fiscal quarter and that issued prior to the actual earnings announcement date of the prior quarter, deflated by the firm"s stock price on day -1 relative to the prior quarter"s earnings announcement date.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the quarter.
MB is the firm"s market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the quarter.
RTNVOL is the standard deviation of the firm"s daily raw stock return over the 250 trading days before the beginning of the quarter (a minimum of 100 days is required).
EARNVOL is the standard deviation of the seasonal change in quarterly EPS scaled by assets per share as of the beginning of the quarter based using the 16 most recent quarters of data (we require complete data for all 16 quarters). Steps Used to Assign Management Earnings Forecasts into Sub-samples of Voluntary MEFs, Disclose or Abstain (DOA) MEFs, and Opportunistic MEFs. IP denotes net insider purchasing and IS denotes net insider selling. V1a, V1b, V1c, and V1d denote the steps to identify voluntary MEFs, D2a, D2b, and D2c denote the steps to identify DOA MEFs, and O3a, O3b, and O3c denote the steps to identify opportunistic MEFs (see section 3.1 of the text for a detailed discussion of the sub-sample construction process). divided by the annual total number of shares sold (purchased) by insiders of the firm. †"s in the column of DOA are used to indicate whether the insider trading frequency (or intensity) in the specific five day interval is significantly lower than that in the [+1, +5] interval at the 5% level. ‡"s in the row of [+1,+5] are used to indicate whether the insider trading frequency (or intensity) for the specific subsample is significantly lower than that for the DOA subsample at the 5% significance level. Panel C reports the MEF announcement date CAR from day 0 to day +1 which is calculated as the firm"s two-day buy-and-hold return minus the CRSP value-weighted index return. §"s under either Opportunistic or Voluntary are used to indicate whether the stock return around the specific subsample differs from that around the DOA subsample at the 5% level. See section 3, Figure 1 , and Table 2 for a description of the process used to assign MEFs to the DOA, opportunistic and voluntary subsamples. Quarters with (without) MEFs are firm-quarters that have at least one (no) MEFs issued during the period from last quarter"s actual earnings announcement date up through one day before the current quarter"s actual earnings announcement date. A quarter is defined as a Voluntary, DOA, or Opportunistic if all MEFs issued in the quarter are classified as DOA, Opportunistic or Voluntary, respectively. See section 3, Figure 1 , and Table 2 for a description of the process used to assign MEFs to the DOA, Opportunistic and Voluntary subsamples and Appendix A for detailed variable definitions). ‡ denotes that the coefficient magnitude differs in the direction predicted in Table 1 . Z-statistics for the pooled regressions have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-specific clustering. Year-quarter indicators are included, but are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, two-tailed tests. 
